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Abstract
The present survey aims at presenting the current machine learning
techniques employed in security games domains. Specifically, we focused
on papers and works developed by the Teamcore of University of Southern
California, which deepened different directions in this field. After a brief
introduction on Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) and the poaching
setting, the rest of the work presents how to model a boundedly rational
attacker taking into account her human behavior, then describes how
to face the problem of having attacker’s payoffs not defined and how to
estimate them and, finally, presents how online learning techniques have
been exploited to learn a model of the attacker.
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1 Introduction
The present survey aims at presenting the current main machine learning tech-
niques employed in security games domains. Specifically, we focused on pa-
pers and works developed by the Teamcore of University of Southern Califor-
nia, which deepened different directions in this field. Among several works on
this topic, e.g., [3, 9, 22, 15, 10, 11], this paper is essentially based on these
works [12, 6, 4, 8, 17, 16].
After a brief introduction on Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) and the
poaching setting, the rest of the work is organized according to the different
problems that has been dealt with.
• Section 2 shows how to model a boundedly rational attacker taking into
account her human behavior.
• Section 3 faces the problem of having attacker’s payoffs not defined and
how to estimate them studying the regret of the defender.
• Section 4 presents how online learning techniques have been exploited to
learn a model of the attacker.
1.1 Stackelberg paradigm and SSG
Usually, to represent security scenarios, a specific class of games is adopted,
i.e., Stackelberg Games [23]. Here, on one side there is the Defender, which
publicly commits to a mixed strategy, i.e., a probability distribution on the
actions available to the player, and on the other side there is an Attacker, that
observes the commitment of the Defender and acts consequently. Such games
are called Stackelberg Security Games (SSG). Specifically, in SSGs, the Defender
attempts to protect a set of T targets from an Attacker, by optimally allocating
a set of R resources, R < T . Denote by x = {xt} the Defender’s strategy
where xt is the coverage probability at target t, the set of feasible strategies
is: X = {x : 0 ≤ xt ≤ 1,
∑
t xt ≤ R}. If the adversary attacks t when the
defender is not protecting it, the adversary receives a reward Rat , otherwise the
adversary gets a penalty P at . Conversely, the Defender receives a penalty P
d
t in
the former case and a reward Rdt in the latter case. Let (R
a,P a) and (Rd,P d)
be the payoff vectors. The players’ expected utilities at t is computed as:
Uat (x,R
a, P a) = xtP
a
t + (1− xt)R
a
t
Udt (x,R
d, P d) = xtR
d
t + (1− xt)P
d
t
In general, in such situations, the most appropriate solution concept is the
Leader–follower equilibrium. The problem of finding such equilibrium can be
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formulated as:
argmax
xl,x
∗
f
∑
al∈Al
∑
af∈Af
[Ul(al, af)xl(al)x
∗
f
(af)]
s.t.
∑
al∈Al
xl(al) = 1
xl(al) ≥ 0 ∀al ∈ Al
x∗f ∈ argmaxxl
∑
al∈Al
∑
al∈Al
[Uf(af, al)xf(af)xl(al)]
s.t.
∑
af∈Af
xf(af) = 1
xf(af) ≥ 0 ∀af ∈ Af
where xl(al) (xf (af )) is the probability that the leader (follower) will play
action al (af ) and x
∗
f is the best strategy of the follower.
In zero–sum games, the Leader–follower equilibrium coincides with the Nash
equilibrium [21] and the maxmin/minmax strategies.
1.2 The poaching setting
Poaching and illegal over–fishing are critical international problems leading to
destruction of ecosystems. For example, three out of nine tiger species have gone
extinct in the past 100 years and others are now endangered due to poaching [18].
Law enforcement agencies in many countries are hence challenged with applying
their limited resources to protecting endangered animals and fish stocks.
Building upon the success of applying SSGs to protect infrastructure in-
cluding airports [14], ports [19] and trains [27], researchers are now applying
game theory to green security domains, e.g., protecting fisheries from over–
fishing [1, 5] and protecting wildlife from poaching [25]. There are several key
features in green security domains that introduce novel research challenges.
1. The defender is faced with multiple adversaries who carry out repeated
and frequent illegal activities (attacks), yielding a need to go beyond the
one–shot SSG model.
2. In carrying out such frequent attacks, the attackers generally do not con-
duct extensive surveillance before performing an attack and spend less
time and effort in each attack, and thus it becomes more important to
model the attackers’ bounded rationality and bounded surveillance.
3. There is more attack data available in green security domains than in
infrastructure security domains, which makes it possible to learn the at-
tackers’ decision making model from data.
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2 Using human behavior models in solving SSGs
In game theory, the adversary is usually represented as a fully rational player.
In real–world, people are not fully rational, i.e., their choices are not simply
determined by mere calculations. The problem that is addressed here is the
representation of a boundedly rational attacker in SSGs. In fact, the fully
rationality condition is relaxed to make an important step towards modeling
real–world attacker, both to extract useful information about already gathered
data, but also to build new models of attackers to enhance the current level of
security.
2.1 SUQR: modeling a boundedly rational attacker
In SSGs, attacker bounded rationality is often modeled via behavior models such
as Quantal Response (QR) [7]. The QR model predicts a stochastic distribution
of the adversary response: the greater the expected value of a target the more
likely the adversary will attack that target. QR’s key parameter λ represents
the level of rationality in adversary’s response: as λ increases, the predicted
response by the QR model converges to the optimal action of the adversary.
Instead of using a human behavior model, MATCH, the best algorithm up to
2013, computes a robust defender strategy by guaranteeing a bound on the
defender’s loss in her expected value if the adversary deviates from her optimal
choice. More specifically, the defender’s loss is constrained to be no more than a
factor of β times the adversary’s loss in his expected value. The key parameter
β describes how much the defender is willing to sacrifice when the adversary
deviates from the optimal action.
The key idea in Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) is that individuals have
their own evaluations of each alternative during decision making. Recall that in
an SSG, the information presented to the human subject for each choice includes:
the marginal coverage on target t(xt); the subject’s reward and penalty (R
a
t , P
a
t );
the defender’s reward and penalty (Rdt , P
d
t ). Inspired by the idea of SEU, it has
been proposed [12] a subjective utility function of the adversary for SSG as the
following:
Uˆat′(x,R
a,P a) = w1xt + w2R
a
t + w3P
a
t
In fact, SUQR is motivated by the lens model which suggested that eval-
uation of adversaries over targets is based on a linear combination of multiple
observable features. One key advantage of these behavioral models is that they
can be used to predict attack frequency for multiple attacks by the adversary,
where in the attacking probability is a normalization of attack frequency.
The novelty of this subjective utility function is the linear combination of the
values (rewards/penalty) and coverage probabilities. (Note that the decision–
making of the general population is modeled, not of each individual since there
are no sufficient data for each specific subject). This model actually leads to
higher prediction accuracy than the classic expected value function. Other
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alternatives to this subjective utility function are feasible, e.g., including all
the information presented to the subjects:
Uˆat (x,R
a,P a) = w1xt + w2R
a
t + w3P
a
t + w4R
d
t + w5P
d
t
Then, the QR model is modified by replacing the classic expected value
function with the SU function, leading to the SUQR model. In the SUQR
model, the probability that the adversary chooses target t, qt, is given by:
qt(x,R
a,P a) =
eλUˆ
a
t (x,R
a,Pa)∑
t′ e
λUˆa
t′
(x,Ra,Pa)
The problem of finding the optimal strategy for the defender can therefore
be formulated as:
maxx
T∑
t=1
eλU
a
t (x,R
a,Pa)∑
t′ e
λUa
t′
(x,Ra,Pa)
(xtR
d
t + (1 − xt)P
d
t )
s.t.
T∑
t=1
xt ≤ K, 0 ≤ xt ≤ 1
Here, the objective is to maximize the defender’s expected value given that
the adversary chooses to attack each target with a probability according to the
SUQR model.
2.1.1 Learning SUQR parameters
Without loss of generality, λ = 1. As customarily done in traditional ma-
chine learning, Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) to learn the parameters
(w1, w2, w3) is employed. Given the defender strategy x and N samples of the
players’ choices, the log–likelihood of (w1, w2, w3) is given by:
logL(w1, w2, w3|x) =
N∑
j=1
log[qtj(w1, w2, w3|x)]
where tj is the target that is chosen in sample j and qtj (w1, w2, w3|x) is the
probability that the adversary chooses the target tj. Let Nt be the number of
subjects attacking target t. Then:
logL(w1, w2, w3|x) =
T∑
t=1
Ntlog[qtj(w1, w2, w3|x)]
It can be shown that the Hessian matrix of logL[qtj(w1, w2, w3|x)] is negative
semi–definite. Thus, this function has an unique local maximum point and
hence a convex optimization solver can be used to compute the optimal weights
(w1, w2, w3), e.g., fmincon in Matlab.
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2.2 From MATCH to SHARP
Starting from the above results, a new model is now introduced, SHARP [6],
which:
• reasons based on success or failure of the adversary’s past actions on ex-
posed portions of the attack surface to model adversary adaptiveness;
• reasons about similarity between exposed and unexposed areas of the at-
tack surface, and also incorporates a discounting parameter to mitigate
adversary’s lack of exposure to enough of the attack surface;
• integrates a non–linear probability weighting function to capture the ad-
versary’s true weighting of probability.
Following the approach presented in the previous section, MLE has been
applied to learn the weights of the SUQR model based on data collected from
our human subject experiments and found that the weights on coverage proba-
bility were positive for all the experiments. That is, counter–intuitively humans
were modeled as being attracted to regions with high coverage probability, even
though they were not attacking targets with very high coverage but they were
going after targets with moderate to very low coverage probability.
To address this issue, a solution can be the augmentation of the Subjec-
tive Utility function with a two–parameter probability weighting function, that
can be either inverse S–shaped (concave near probability zero and convex near
probability one) or S–shaped.
f(p) =
δpγ
δpγ + (1− p)γ
(1)
The SU of an adversary denoted by a can then be computed as:
SUai (x) = w1f(xi) + w2R
a
i + w3P
a
i ,
where f(xi) for coverage probability xi is computed as per Equation (1).
The two parameters δ and γ control the elevation and curvature of the function
respectively. γ < 1 results in an inverse S-shaped curve while γ > 1 results in
an S–shaped curve. This is the PSU (Probability weighted Subjective Utility)
function. The curve representing human weights for probability is S–shaped in
nature, and not inverse S-shaped as prospect theory suggests. The S–shaped
curve indicates that people would overweigh high probabilities and underweigh
low to medium probabilities.
W.r.t. MATCH, SHARP introduces a new feature – distance – that affects
the reward and hence the obvious question for us was to investigate the effect
of this new feature in predicting adversary behavior. Several variations of PSU
with different combinations of features can be considered.
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SUai (x) = w1f(xi) + w2φi + w3P
a
i (2)
SUai (x) = w1f(xi) + w2R
a
i + w3P
a
i + w4Di (3)
SUai (x) = w1f(xi) + w2φi + w3P
a
i + w4Di (4)
where φi and Di refer to the animal density at target i and the distance to
target i from the poacher’s starting location respectively.
2.2.1 Adaptive utility model
A second major innovation in SHARP is the adaptive nature of the adversary
and addressing the issue of attack surface exposure. The attack surface α is
defined as the n–dimensional space of the features used to model adversary
behavior.
For example, as per the third PSU model in Equation (4), this would mean
the space represented by the following four features: coverage probability, ani-
mal density, adversary penalty and distance from the starting location.
A target profile βk ∈ α is defined as a point on the attack surface α and
can be associated with a target. Exposing the adversary to a lot of different
target profiles would therefore mean exposing the adversary to more of the
attack surface and gathering valuable information about their behavior. While
a particular target location, defined as a distinct region in the 2–d space, can
only be associated with one target profile in a particular round, more than one
target may be associated with the same target profile in the same round.
Observation 1. Adversaries who have succeeded in attacking a target associated
with a particular target profile in one round, tend to attack a target with similar
target profiles in next round.
Observation 2. Adversaries who have failed in attacking a target associated
with a particular target profile in one round, tend not to attack a target with
similar’ target profiles in the next round.
The vulnerability associated with a target profile βi, which was shown to the
adversary in round r, denoted V rβi , is defined as a function of the total number
of successes and failures on the concerned target profile in that round (denoted
by successrβi and failure
r
βi
respectively).
V rβi =
successrβi − failure
r
βi
successrβi + failure
r
βi
Therefore, more successful attacks and few failures on a target profile in-
dicate that it was highly vulnerable in that round. Because multiple targets
can be associated with the same target profile and the pure strategy generated
based on the mixed strategy x in a particular round may result in a defender
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being present at some of these targets while not at others, there may be both
successes and failures associated with the same target profile in that round.
The attractiveness of a target profile βi at the end of round R, denoted A
R
βi
,
is defined as a function of the vulnerabilities for βi from round 1 to round R.
ARβi =
∑R
r=1 V
r
βi
R
Therefore, the attractiveness of a target profile is modeled as the average
of the vulnerabilities for that target profile over all the rounds till round R.
This is consistent with the notion that a target profile which has led to more
successful attacks over several rounds will be perceived as more attractive by
the adversary.
2.2.2 SHARP’s utility Computation
Existing models (such as SUQR) only consider the adversary’s actions from
round (r − 1) to predict their actions in round r. However, it is clear that the
adversary’s actions in a particular round are dependent on his past successes and
failures. Thus, a novel adaptive probability weighted subjective utility function
that captures this adaptive nature of the adversary’s behavior by capturing
the shifting trends in attractiveness of various target profiles over rounds is
proposed.
ASURβi = (1− d ∗A
R
βi
)w1f(xβi) + (1 + d ∗A
R
βi
)w2φβi+
+ (1 + d ∗ARβi)w3P
a
βi
+ (1− d ∗ARβi)w4Dβi
d is a discounting parameter which is based on a measure of the amount of
attack surface exposed. d is low in the initial rounds when the defender does
not have enough of the right kind of data, but would gradually increase as more
information about the attacker’s preferences about various regions of the attack
surface become available.
Now, let us look at how reasoning about unexposed portions of the attack
surface based on the exposed areas. If a target profile βu was not exposed
to attacker response in round r, the defender will not be able to compute the
vulnerability V rβu . Therefore, it is not possible to estimate the attractiveness for
βu and hence the optimal defender strategy. So, in keeping with the analysis on
available data and based on the spillover effect introduced earlier, the distance–
weighted k–nearest neighbors algorithm is employed to obtain the vulnerability
V rβu of an unexposed target profile βu in round r, based on the k most similar
target profiles which were exposed to the attacker in round r.
2.2.3 Generating defender’s strategies against SHARP
While SHARP provides an adversarymodel, the defender strategies against such
model must be generated. To that end, first the parameters of SHARP from
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available data are learned. Then, future round strategies against the boundedly
rational adversary are generated, characterized by the learned model parameters
by solving the following optimization problem:
maxx∈X
[∑
i∈T
Udi (x)q
R
i (w|x)
]
where qRi (w|x) is the probability that the adversary will attack target i in
round R.
2.3 Learning adversary models from three defender’s strate-
gies
Here, a new approach to learn the parameters of the behavioral model of a
bounded rational attacker (thereby pinpointing a near optimal strategy) is de-
veloped, by observing how the attacker responds to only three defender strate-
gies.
Note: even though the setting is the same of the previous sections, since some
assumptions changed, e.g., the adaptivity of the attacker, we slightly change the
adopted notation to avoid confusion.
Let the utility function of the attacker for target t ∈ T be denoted by
ut : [0, 1] → R. Given a coverage probability vector x ∈ X, the utility of the
attacker under strategy x is defined as ut(xt). Upon observing the defender’s
strategy x, the attacker computes the utility on each target t, ut(xt), and based
on these utilities responds to the defender’s strategy. Here, a non–adaptive
attacker is considered. She attacks target t with probability:
Dx(t) =
eut(xi)∑
i∈T e
ui(xi)
Our model is a generalization of bounded rationality models such as SUQR.
Suppose the same mixed strategy x is played for multiple time steps. The
empirical distribution of attacks on target t under x is denoted by Dˆx(·). Fur-
thermore, it is assumed that for the strategies, and for all t, Dx(t) ≥ ρ, for
some ρ = 1
poly(n) . This assumption is required to estimate the value of D
x(t)
with polynomially many samples. Our goal is to learn the utility functions,
ut(·) for all t ∈ T , by observing attacker’s responses to a choice of cover-
age probability vectors x ∈ X. This allows to find an approximately opti-
mal defender strategy — the strategy that leads to the best defender utility.
uˆt : [0, 1]→ R uniformly approximates or uniformly learns ut(·) within an error
of ǫ, if ∀x ∈ [0, 1], |uˆt(x) − ut(x)| ≤ ǫ. Note that the attacker’s mixed strategy
remains the same when the utility functions corresponding to all targets are
increased by the same value. Therefore, only a normalized representation of the
utility functions can be learned, such that for all t and all x, |uˆt(x)+c−ut(x)| ≤ ǫ
for some c.
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2.3.1 Linear utility functions
Assume that the utility functions are linear and denoted by ut(x) = wtx + ct.
Normalizing the utilities, without loss of generality, cn = 0.
Theorem 1. Suppose the functions u1(·), . . . , un(·) are linear. Consider any
3 strategies x,y, z ∈ X such that for any t < n, |(xt − yt)(xn − zn) − (xn −
yn)(xt − zt)| ≥ λ, and for any two different strategies p, q ∈ {x,y, z}, it holds
|pt − qt| ≥ ν. If it is possible to access m = Ω
(
1
ρ
(
1
ǫνλ
)2
log
(
n
δ
))
samples of
each of these strategies, then with probability 1− δ, each ut(·) can be uniformly
learned within error ǫ.
ν depends on how different the strategies are from each other — a very
small value means that they are almost identical on some coordinates. The
lower bound of λ would not be very small unless there is a very specific relation
between the strategies. As a sanity check, if the three strategies were chosen
uniformly at random from the simplex, both values would be at least 1/poly(n).
In the quantal best–response model, for each strategy x, the ratio between the
attack probabilities of two targets t and n follows the relation:
ut(xt) = ln
(
Dx(t)
Dx(n)
)
Therefore, each strategy induces n − 1 linear equations that can be used
to solve for the coefficients of ut. However, only an estimate Dˆ
x(t) of the
probability that target t is attacked under a strategy x, based on the given
samples, can be obtained. So, the inaccuracy in our estimates of ln
(
Dˆx(t)
Dˆx(n)
)
leads to inaccuracy in the estimated polynomial uˆt. For sufficiently accurate
estimates Dx(t), the value of ut differs from the true value by at most ǫ.
Lemma 1. Given x ∈ X, let Dx(t) be the empirical distribution of attacks
based on m = Ω
(
1
ρ
(
1
ǫνλ
)2
log
(
n
δ
))
samples. With probability 1 − δ, for all
t ∈ T , 1
ǫ
≤ Dˆ
x(t)
Dx(t) ≤ 1 + ǫ.
Theorem 2. Suppose the functions u1(·), . . . , un(·) are polynomials of degree at
most d. Consider any 2d+1 strategies, y(1), . . . ,y(d),y(d+1) = x(1), . . . ,x(d)x(d+1)
such that for all k, k′, k 6= k′, y
(k)
1 = y
(k′)
1 , p
(k)
n = p
(k′)
n , |y
(k)
n − y
(k′)
n | ≥ ν and
for all t < n, |x
(k)
t − x
(k′)
t | ≥ ν. If it is possible to have access to m =
Ω
(
1
ρ
(
1
ǫνλ
)2
log
(
n
δ
))
samples of each of these strategies, then with probability
1− δ, each ut(·) can be uniformly learned within error ǫ.
Now, any utility function that is continuous and L–Lipschitz, i.e., for all t
and values x and y, |ut(x) − ut(y)| ≤ L|x− y|, should be learned. Such utility
functions can be uniformly learned up to error ǫ, using O
(
L
ǫ
)
strategies. For
any L–Lipschitz function ut(x), there is a polynomial of degree m = 12L/ǫ that
uniformly approximates ut(x) within error of ǫ/2.
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Theorem 3. Suppose the functions u1(·), . . . , un(·) are L-Lipschitz. For d =
12L/ǫ, consider any 2d+1 strategies, y(1), . . . ,y(d),y(d+1) = x(1), . . . ,x(d)x(d+1)
such that for all k, k′, k 6= k′, y
(k)
1 = y
(k′)
1 , p
(k)
n = p
(k′)
n , |y
(k)
n −y
(k′)
n | ≥ ν and for all
t < n, |x
(k)
t −x
(k′)
t | ≥ ν. If it is possible to have access to m = Ω
(
L2
ρǫ24L/ǫ
log
(
n
δ
))
samples of each of these strategies, then with probability 1− δ, each ut(·) can be
uniformly learned within error ǫ.
2.3.2 Learning the optimal strategy
So far, the focus has been on the problem of uniformly learning the utility
function of the attacker. Now, it is shown that an accurate estimate of this utility
function allows to pinpoint an almost optimal strategy for the defender. Let the
utility function of the defender on target t ∈ T be denoted by vt : [0, 1]→ [−1, 1].
Given a coverage probability vector x ∈ X, the utility the defender receives
when target t is attacked i vt(xt). The overall expected utility of the defender
is:
V (x) =
∑
t∈T
Dx(t)vt(xt)
Let uˆt be the learned attacker utility functions, and D¯
x(t) be the predicted
attack probability on target t under strategy x, according to the utilities uˆt,
i.e.:
D¯x(t) =
euˆt(xi)∑
i∈T e
uˆi(xi)
Let V¯ (x) be the predicted expected utility of the defender based on the
learned attacker utilities D¯x(t), i.e., V¯ (x) =
∑
t∈T D¯
x(t)vt(xt). When the
attacker utilities are uniformly learned within error ǫ, then V¯ estimates V with
error at most 8ǫ. At a high level, this is established by showing that one can
predict the attack distribution using the learned attacker utilities. Furthermore,
optimizing the defender’s strategy against the approximate attack distributions
leads to an approximately optimal strategy for the defender.
Theorem 4. Assume for all x and any t ∈ T , |uˆt(xt) − ut(xt)| ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/4.
Then, for all x, |V¯ (x) − V (x)| ≤ 4ǫ. Furthermore, let x′ = argmaxx V¯ (x) be
the predicted optimal strategy, then maxx V (x)− V (x′) ≤ 8ǫ.
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3 Determining attacker’s payoffs exploiting regret–
based solutions
The adversary behavior models (capturing bounded rationality) can be learned
from real–world data on where adversaries have attacked, and game payoffs can
be determined precisely from data on animal densities.
One key approach to modeling payoff uncertainty is to express the adver-
sary’s payoffs as lying within specific intervals: for each target t, it holds:
Rat ∈ [R
a
min(t), R
a
max(t)], P
a
t ∈ [P
a
min(t), P
a
max(t)]
While a behavioral model from real–world data can be learned, access to data
to precisely compute animal density may be not always possible. For example,
given limited numbers of rangers, they may have patrolled and collected wildlife
data from only a small portion of a national park, and thus payoffs in other areas
of the park may remain uncertain. Also, due to the dynamic changes (e.g.,
animal migration), players’ payoffs may become uncertain in the next season.
Hence, a new MiniMaxRegret (MMR)–based robust algorithm is introduced,
ARROW, to handle payoff uncertainty in Green Security Games (a.k.a. GSGs,
i.e., Security Games for the protection of wildlife, forest and fisheries), taking
into account adversary behavioral models. Here, the main focus is on zero–sum
games, as motivated by recent work in green security domains and earlier major
SSG applications that use zero–sum games. In addition, a model inspired by
SUQR is adopted, where the subjective utility function is:
Uˆat (x,R
a,P a) = w1xt + w2R
a
t + w3P
a
t + w4Φt
where xt is the coverage probability of target t and Φt is another feature
of target t, e.g., distance, as seen for SHARP. MMRb with uncertain payoffs is
now formulated for both players in zero–sum SSG with a boundedly rational
attacker.
Definition 1. Given (Ra,P a), the defender’s behavioral regret is the loss in
her utility for playing a strategy x instead of the optimal strategy, which is
represented as follows:
Rb(x,R
a,P a) = maxx′∈XF (x
′,Ra,P a)− F (x,Ra,P a)
where
F (x,Ra,P a) =
∑
t
qˆt(x,R
a,P a)Udt (x,R
d,P d)
Behavioral regret measures the distance in terms of utility loss from the
defender strategy x to the optimal strategy given the attacker payoffs. Here,
F (x,Ra,P a) is the defender’s utility for playing x where the attacker payoffs,
whose response follows SUQR, are (Ra,P a). The defender’s payoffs in zero-
sum games are Rd = −P a and P d = −Ra. When the payoffs are uncertain,
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if the defender plays a strategy x, she receives different behavioral regrets w.r.t
to different payoff instances within the uncertainty intervals. Thus, she could
receive a behavioral max regret which is defined as follows.
Definition 2. Given payoff intervals I, the behavioral max regret for the de-
fender to play a strategy x is the maximum behavioral regret over all payoff
instances:
MRb(x, I) = max(Ra,Pa)∈IRb(x,R
a,P a)
Definition 3. Given payoff intervals I, the behavioral minimax regret prob-
lem attempts to find the defender optimal strategy that minimizes the MRb she
receives:
MMRb(I) = minx∈XMRb(x, I)
Intuitively, behavorial minimax regret ensures that the defender’s strategy
minimizes the loss in the solution quality over the uncertainty of all possible
payoff realizations.
Overall, MMRb can be reformulated as minimizing the max regret r such
that r is no less than the behavioral regrets over all payoff instances within the
intervals:
minx∈X,r∈R r
s.t. r ≥ F (x′,Ra,P a)− F (x,Ra,P a), ∀(Ra,P a) ∈ I,x′ ∈X
The set of constraints is infinite since X and I are continuous. One practi-
cal approach to optimization with large constraint sets is constraint sampling,
coupled with constraint generation (a.k.a. row generation). Following this ap-
proach, ARROW samples a subset of constraints and gradually expands this set
by adding violated constraints to the relaxed problem until convergence to the
optimal MMRb solution.
Specifically, ARROW begins by sampling pairs (Ra,P a) of the adversary
payoffs uniformly from I. The corresponding optimal strategies for the defender
given these payoff samples, denoted x′, are then computed using the PASAQ
algorithm [26] to obtain a finite set S of sampled constraints. These sampled
constraints are then used to solve the corresponding relaxed MMRb program
using the R.ARROW algorithm. The optimal solution (lb,x∗) is thus obtained,
providing a lower bound (lb) on the true MMRb. Then constraint generation is
applied to determine violated constraints (if any). This uses the M.ARROW al-
gorithm which computesMRb(x
∗, I), the optimal regret of x∗ which is an upper
bound (ub) on the true MMRb. If ub > lb, the optimal solution of M.ARROW,
{x
′,∗,Ra,∗,P a,∗} provides the maximally violated constraint, which is added
to S. Otherwise, x∗ is the minimax optimal strategy and lb = ub =MMRb(I).
The first step of ARROW is to solve the relaxed MMRb problem using
R.ARROW. This relaxed MMRb problem is non–convex. Thus, R.ARROW
presents two key ideas for efficiency:
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1. binary search (which iteratively searches the defender’s utility space to find
the optimal solution) to remove the fractional terms in relaxed MMRb;
2. it then applies piecewise–linear approximation to linearize the non–convex
terms of the resulting decision problem at each binary search step.
Theorem 5. R.ARROW provides an O
(
ǫ+ 1
M
)
–optimal solution of relaxed
MMRb where ǫ is the tolerance of binary search and M is the number of piece-
wise segments.
Given the optimal solution x∗ returned by R.ARROW, the second step of
ARROW is to compute MRb of x
∗ using M.ARROW. A local search with
multiple starting points is employed since allows to reach different local optima.
While ARROW incorporates an adversary behavioral model, it may not be
applicable for green security domains where there may be a further paucity of
data in which not only payoffs are uncertain but also parameters of the be-
havioral model are difficult to learn accurately. Therefore, a novel MMR-based
algorithm, ARROW–Perfect, can be introduced to handle uncertainty in both
players’ payoffs assuming a perfectly rational attacker. In general, ARROW–
Perfect follows the same constraint sampling and constraint generation method-
ology as ARROW. Yet, by leveraging the property that the attacker’s optimal
response is a pure strategy (given a perfectly rational attacker) and the game
is zero–sum, the exact optimal solutions for computing both relaxed MMR and
max regret in polynomial time are obtained (while we cannot provide such guar-
antees for a boundedly rational attacker).
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4 Online learning
4.1 Handling exploration–exploitation tradeoffs in Secu-
rity Games
Previous research optimizes defenders’ strategies by modeling this problem as a
repeated Stackelberg game, capturing the special property in this domain fre-
quent interactions between defenders and attackers. However, this research fails
to handle exploration–exploitation tradeoff in this domain caused by the fact
that defenders only have knowledge of attack activities at targets they protect.
The problem is formulated as a Restless Multi–Armed Bandit (RMAB) model
to address this challenge. To use Whittle index policy to plan for patrol strate-
gies in the RMAB, two sufficient conditions for indexability and an algorithm
to numerically evaluate indexability are provided. Given indexability, a binary
search based algorithm to find Whittle index policy efficiently is proposed.
It is assumed that defenders have knowledge of all poaching activities through-
out the wildlife protected area. Unfortunately, given vast geographic areas for
wildlife protection, defenders do not have knowledge of poaching activities in
areas they do not protect. Thus, defenders are faced with the exploration–
exploitation tradeoff. The exploration–exploitation tradeoff here is different
from that in the non–Bayesian stochastic multi–armed bandit problem. In
stochastic multi–armed bandit problems, the rewards of every arm are random
variables with a stationary unknown distribution. However, in our problem,
patrol affects attack activities, i.e.m, more patrol is likely to decrease attack ac-
tivities and less patrol is likely to increase attack activities. Thus, the random
variable distribution is changing depending on player’s choice — more selection
(patrol) leads to lower reward (less attack activities) and less selection (patrol)
leads to higher reward (more attack activities). On the other hand, adversarial
multi–armed bandit problem is also not an appropriate model for this domain.
In adversarial multi–armed bandit problems, the reward can arbitrarily change
while the attack activities in our problem are unlikely to change rapidly in a
short period.
Poaching activity is a dynamic process affected by patrol. If patrollers patrol
in a certain location frequently, it is very likely that the poachers poaching in
this location will switch to other locations for poaching. On the other hand,
if a location has not been patrolled for a long time, poachers may gradually
notice that and switch to this location for poaching. In the wildlife protection
domain, both patrollers and poachers do not have perfect observation of their
opponents’ actions. This observation imperfection lies in two aspects: limited
observability — patrollers/poachers do not know what happens at locations
they do not patrol/poach; partial observability — patrollers/poachers do not
have perfect observation even at locations they patrol/poach — the location
might be large (e.g., a 2km × 2km area) so that it is possible that patrollers
and poachers do not see each other even if they are at the same location. These
two properties make it extremely difficult for defenders to optimally plan their
patrol strategies.
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4.1.1 Problem formulation
There are n targets that are indexed by N = {1, . . . , n}. Defenders have k patrol
resources that can be deployed to these n targets. At every round, defenders
choose k targets to protect. After that, defenders will have an observation of
the number of attack activities for targets they protect, and no information for
targets they do not protect. The objective for defenders is to decide which k
targets to protect at every round to catch as many attackers as possible. Due
to the partial observability on defenders’ side (defenders’ observation of attack
activities is not perfect even for targets they protect), a hidden variable at-
tack intensity is introduced, representing the true degree of attack intensity at
a certain target. Clearly, this hidden variable attack intensity cannot directly
be observed by defenders. Instead, defenders’ observation is a random variable
conditioned on this hidden variable attack intensity, and the larger the attack
intensity is, the more likely it is for defenders to observe more attack activities
during their patrol. The hidden variable attack intensity is discretized into ns
levels, denoted by S = {0, 1, . . . , ns − 1}. Lower i represents lower attack in-
tensity. For a certain target, its attack intensity transitions after every round.
If this target is protected, attack intensity transitions according to a ns × ns
transition matrix T 1; if this target is not protected, attack intensity transitions
according to another ns×ns transition matrix T
0. The transition matrix repre-
sents how patrol affects attack intensity — T 1 tends to reduce attack intensity
and T 0 tends to increase attack intensity. Note that different targets may have
different transition matrices because some targets may be more attractive to
attackers (for example, some locations may have more animal resources in the
wildlife protection domain) so that it is more difficult for attack intensity to go
down and easier for attack intensity to go up. Also defenders’ observations of
attack activities are discretized into no levels, denoted by O = {0, 1, . . . , no−1}.
Lower i represents less attack activities defenders observe. Note that defend-
ers will only have observation for targets they protect. A ns × no observation
matrix O determines how the observation depends on the hidden variable at-
tack intensity. Generally, the larger the attack intensity is, the more likely it is
for defenders to observe more attack activities during their patrol. Similar to
transition matrices, different targets may have different observation matrices.
While defenders get observations of attack activities during their patrol, they
also receive rewards for that — arresting poachers/fareevaders/smugglers bring
benefit. Clearly, the reward defenders receive depends on their observation and
thus the reward function is defined as R(o), o ∈ O — larger i leads to higher
reward R(i). Note that defenders only get rewards for targets they protect.
To summarize, for the targets defenders protect, defenders get an observation
depending on its current attack intensity, get the reward associated with the
observation, and then the attack intensity transitions according to T 1; for the
targets defenders do not protect, defenders do not have any observation, get
reward 0 and the attack intensity transitions according to T 0.
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4.1.2 Learning model from defenders’ previous observations
Given defenders’ action history {ai} and observation history {oi}, our objec-
tive is to learn the transition matrices T 1 and T 0, observation matrix O and
initial belief π. Due to the existence of hidden variables {si}, expectation–
maximization (EM) algorithm is used for learning. The update steps are the
following:
π
(d+1)
i = P (s1 = i|x; θ
d)
T
1(d+1)
ij =
∑T−1
t=1:at=1
P (st = i, st+1 = j|x; θ
d)∑T−1
t=1:at=1
P (st = i|x; θd)
T
0(d+1)
ij =
∑T−1
t=1:at=0
P (st = i, st+1 = j|x; θd)∑T−1
t=1:at=0
P (st = i|x; θd)
O
(d+1)
ij =
∑T
t=1:at=1
P (st = i|x; θd)I(ot = j)∑T
t=1:at=1
P (st = i|x; θd)
4.1.3 Restless multi–armed bandit problems
In RMABs, each arm represents an independent Markov machine. At every
round, the player chooses k out of n arms (k < n) to activate and receives
the reward determined by the state of the activated arms. After that, the
states of all arms will transition to new states according to certain Markov
transition probabilities. The problem is called restless because the states of
passive arms will also transition like active arms. The aim of the player is to
maximize his cumulative reward by choosing which arms to activate at every
round. It is PSPACE–hard to find the optimal strategy to general RMABs [13].
An index policy assigns an index to each state of each arm to measure how
rewarding it is to activate an arm at a particular state. At every round, the
index policy chooses to pick the k arms whose current states have the highest
indices. Since the index of an arm only depends on the properties of this arm,
index policy reduces an n–dimensional problem to n 1–dimensional problems so
that the complexity is reduced from exponential with n to linear with n. Whittle
proposed a heuristic index policy for RMABs by considering the Lagrangian
relaxation of the problem [24]. It has been shown that Whittle index policy
is asymptotically optimal under certain conditions as k and n tend to infinity
with k/n fixed. When k and n are finite, extensive empirical studies have also
demonstrated the near–optimal performance of Whittle index policy. Whittle
index measures how attractive it is to activate an arm based on the concept of
subsidy for passivity. It gives the subsidy m to passive action (not activate) and
the smallest m that would make passive action optimal for the current state is
defined to be the Whittle index for this arm at this state. Whittle index policy
chooses to activate the k arms with the highest Whittle indices. Intuitively,
the larger the m is, the larger the gap is between active action (activate) and
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passive action, the more attractive it is for the player to activate this arm.
Mathematically, denote Vm(x; a = 0) (Vm(x; a = 1)) to be the maximum
cumulative reward the player can achieve until the end if he takes passive (active)
action at the first round at the state x with subsidy m. Whittle index I(x) of
state x is then defined to be:
I(x) = infm{m : Vm(x; a = 0) ≥ Vm(x; a = 1)}
However, Whittle index only exists and Whittle index policy can only be
used when the problem satisfies a property known as indexability. Define Φ(m)
to be the set of states for which passive action is the optimal action given subsidy
m:
Φ(m) = {x : Vm(x; a = 0) ≥ Vm(x; a = 1)}
Definition 4. An arm is indexable if Φ(m) monotonically increases from ∅ to
the whole state space as m increases from −∞ to +∞. An RMAB is indexable
if every arm is indexable.
4.1.4 Restless bandit formulation
Every target is viewed as an arm and defenders choose k arms to activate (k
targets to protect) at every round. Consider a single arm (target), it is associated
with ns (hidden) states, no observations, ns×ns transition matrices T
1 and T 0,
ns × no observation matrix O and reward function R(o), o ∈ O. For the arm
defenders activate, defenders get an observation, get reward associated with the
observation, and the state transitions according to T 1. Note that defenders’
observation is not the state. Instead, it is a random variable conditioned on the
state, and reveals some information about the state. For the arms defenders
do not activate, defenders do not have any observation, get reward 0 and the
state transitions according to T 0. Since defenders can not directly observe the
state, defenders maintain a belief b of the states for each target, based on which
defenders make decisions. The belief is updated according to the Bayesian
rules. The following equation shows the belief update when defenders protect
this target (a = 1) and get observation o or defenders do not protect this target
(a = 0).
b′(s′) =
{
η
∑
s∈S b(s)OsoT
1
ss′ , a = 1∑
s∈S b(s)OsoT
0
ss′ , a = 0
where η is the normalization factor. When defenders do not protect this
target (a = 0), defenders do not have any observation, so their belief is updated
according to the state transition rule. When defenders protect this target (a =
1), their belief is firstly updated according to their observation o (bnew(s) =
ηb(s)Oso according to Bayes’ rule), and then the new belief is then updated
according to the state transition rule:
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b′(s′) =
∑
s∈S
bnew(s)T
1
ss′
=
∑
s∈S
ηb(s)OsoT
1
ss′
= η
∑
s∈S
b(s)OsoT
1
ss′
Now the mathematical definition of Whittle index is presented. Denote
Vm(b) to be the value function for belief state b with subsidy m. Vm(b; a = 0) to
be the value function for belief state b with subsidym and defenders take passive
action. Vm(b; a = 1) to be the value function for belief state b with subsidy m
and defenders take active action. The following equations show these value
functions:
Vm(b; a = 0) = m+ βVm(ba=0)
Vm(b; a = 1) =
∑
s∈S
b(s)
∑
o∈O
OsoR(o) + β
∑
o∈O
∑
s∈S
b(s)OsoVm(b
o
a=1)
Vm(b) = max{Vm(b; a = 0), Vm(b; a = 1)}
When defenders take passive action, they get the immediate reward m and
the β–discounted future reward — value function at new belief ba = 0, which
is updated from b according to the case a = 0. When defenders take active
action, they get the expected immediate reward
∑
s∈S b(s)
∑
o∈O OsoR(o) and
the β–discounted future reward. The value function Vm(b) is the maximum of
Vm(b; a = 0) and Vm(b; a = 1). Whittle index I(b) of belief state b is then
defined to be:
I(b) = infm{m : Vm(b; a = 0) ≥ Vm(b; a = 1)}
The passive action set Φ(m), which is the set of belief states for which passive
action is the optimal action given subsidy m is then defined to be:
Φ(m) = infm{b : Vm(b; a = 0) ≥ Vm(b; a = 1)}
4.1.5 Sufficient condition for indexability
Two sufficient conditions for indexability when no = 2 and ns = 2 are provided.
Denote the transition matrices to be T 0 and T 1, observation matrix to be O.
Clearly in our problem, O11 > O01, O00 > O10 (higher attack intensity leads to
higher probability to see attack activities when patrolling); T 111 > T
1
01, T
1
00 > T
1
10,
T 011 > T
0
01, T
0
00 > T
0
10 (positively correlated arms).
Define α = max{T 011−T
1
01, T
0
11 > T
1
01}. Since it is a two–state problem with
S = {0, 1}, x represents the belief state: x = b(s = 1), which is the probability
of being in state 1.
20
Define Γ1(x) = xT
1
11 + (1 − x)T
1
01 which is the belief for the next round if
the belief for the current round is x and the active action is taken. Similarly,
Γ0(x) = xT
0
11 + (1 − x)T
0
01, which is the belief for the next round if the belief
for the current round is x and the passive action is taken. Below two theorems
demonstrating two sufficient conditions for indexability are presented.
Theorem 6. When α ≤ 0.5, the process is indexable, i.e., for any belief x, if
Vm(x; a = 0) ≥ Vm(x; a = 1), then Vm(x; a = 0) ≥ V m(x; a = 1), ∀m ≥ m.
Theorem 7. When αβ ≤ 0.5 and Γ1(1) ≤ Γ0(0), the process is indexable, i.e.,
for any belief x, if Vm(x; a = 0) ≥ Vm(x; a = 1), then Vm(x; a = 0) ≥ V m(x; a =
1), ∀m ≥ m.
4.1.6 Numerical evaluation of indexability
Proposition 1. If m < R(0)βR(no−1)−R(0)1−β ,Φ(m) = ∅; if m > R(no− 1),Φ(m)
is the whole belief state space.
Thus, it should be determined whether the set Φ(m) monotonically increases
for m ⊆
[
R(0)βR(no−1)−R(0)1−β , R(no − 1)
]
. Numerically, this limited m range is
discretized and then it is evaluated if Φ(m) monotonically increases with the
increase of discretized m. Given the subsidy m, Φ(m) can be determined by
solving a special POMDP model whose conditional observation probability is
dependent on start state and action. The algorithm returns a set D which
contains ns–length vectors d1, d2, . . . , d|D|. Every vector di is associated with
an optimal action ei. Given the belief b, the optimal action is determined by
aopt = ei, i = argmaxj b
Tdj . Thus, Φ(m) = ∪i:ei=0{b : b
Tdi ≥ bTdj , ∀j}.
Given m0 < m1, our aim is to check whether Φ(m0) ⊆ Φ(m0). A MILP to
verify whether such condition holds can be solved.
4.1.7 Computation of Whittle index Policy
Given the indexability, Whittle index can be found by doing a binary search
within the range m ⊆
[
R(0)βR(no−1)−R(0)1−β , R(no − 1)
]
. Given the upper bound
ub and lower bound lb, the problem with middle point lb+ub2 as passive subsidy
is sent to the special POMDP solver to find the optimal action for the current
belief. If the optimal action is active, then the Whittle index is greater than the
middle point so lb← lb+ub2 or else ub←
lb+ub
2 . This binary search algorithm can
find Whittle index with arbitrary precision. Naively, the Whittle index policy
can be found by computing the ǫ–precision indices of all arms and then picking
the k arms with the highest indices.
Specifically, let A be the Whittle index policy to be returned: it is set to be
∅ at the beginning. S is the set of arms that are not known whether belonging
to A or not and is set to be the whole set of arms at the beginning. Before
it finds top–k arms, it tests all the arms in S about their optimal action with
subsidy lb+ub2 . If the optimal action is 1, it means this arm’s index is higher
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than lb+ub2 and it is added to S1; if the optimal action is 0, it means this arm’s
index is lower than lb+ub2 and it is added to S0. At this moment, all arms in
S1 have higher indices than all arms in S0. If there is enough space in A to
include all arms in S1, S1 is added to A, remove them from S and set the upper
bound to be lb+ub2 because S1 belongs to Whittle index policy set and all the
rest arms have the index lower than lb+ub2 . If there is not enough space in A,
S0 is removed from S and set the lower bound to be
lb+ub
2 because S0 does not
belong to Whittle index policy set and all the rest arms have the index higher
than lb+ub2 .
4.1.8 Special POMDP formulation
Here, the algorithm to compute the passive action set Φ(m) with the subsidy m
is discussed. This problem can be viewed as solving a special POMDP model
whose conditional observation probability is dependent on start state and action
while the conditional observation probability is dependent on end state and
action in standard POMDPs.
The original state is s, the agent takes action a, and the state transitions
to s′ according to P (s′|s, a). However, the observation o the agent gets during
this process is dependent on s and a in our special POMDPs; while it depends
on s′ and a in standard POMDPs.
The special POMDP formulation for our problem is straightforward.
• The state space is S = {0, 1, . . . , ns − 1}.
• The action space is A = {0, 1}, where a = 0 represents passive action (do
not protect) and a = 1 represents active action (protect).
• The observation space is O = {−1, 0, 1, . . . , no − 1}. It adds a fake ob-
servation o = −1 to represent no observation when taking action a = 0.
It’s called fake because defenders have probability 1 to observe o = 1 no
matter what the state is when they take action a = 0, so this observation
does not provide any information. When defenders take action a = 1,
they may observe observations O\{−1}.
• The conditional transition probability P (s′|s, a) is defined to be P (s′ =
j|s = i, a = 1) = T 1ij and P (s
′ = j|s = i, a = 0) = T 0ij .
• The conditional observation probability P (o|s, a) is defined to be P (o =
−1|s, a = 0) = 1, ∀s ∈ S;P (o = j|s = i, a = 1) = Oij . Note that the
conditional observation probability here is dependent on the start state s
and action a, while it depends on end state s and action a in standard
POMDP models. Intuitively, defenders’ observation of attack activities
today depends on the attack intensity today, not the transitioned attack
intensity tomorrow.
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• The reward function R is:
R(s, s′, a, o) =
{
0, a = 0
R(o), a = 1
With the transition probability and observation probability, R(s, a) can be
computed. Note that this formulation is also slightly different due to the differ-
ent definition of observation probability.
R(s, a) =
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, a)
∑
o∈O
P (o|s, a)R(s, s′, a, o)
4.1.9 Value iteration for the special POMDP
Different from standard POMDP formulation, the belief update in the special
POMDP formulation is:
b′(s′) =
∑
s′∈S b(s)P (o|s, a)P (s
′|s, a)
P (o|b, a)
where
P (o|b, a) =
∑
s′∈S
∑
s∈S
b(s)P (o|s, a)P (s′|s, a) =
∑
s∈S
b(s)P (o|s, a)
Similar to standard POMDP formulation, the value function is:
V ′(b) = maxa∈A
(∑
s∈S
b(s)R(s, a) + β
∑
o∈O
P (o|b, a)V (boa)
)
which can be broken up to simpler combinations of other value functions:
V ′(b) = maxa∈AVa(b)
Va(b) =
∑
o∈O
V oa (b)
V oa (b) =
∑
s∈S b(s)R(s, a)
|O|
+ βP (o|b, a)V (boa)
All the value functions can be represented as V (b) = maxα∈Dbα since the
update process maintains this property, so the set D is updated when updating
the value function.
23
4.1.10 Planning from POMDP view
Every single target can be modeled as a special POMDP model. Given that,
these POMDP models at all targets can be combined to form a special POMDP
model that describe the whole problem, and solving this special POMDP model
leads to defenders’ exact optimal strategy. Use the superscript i to denote target
i. Generally, the POMDP model for the whole problem is the cross product of
the single–target POMDP models at all targets with the constraint that only k
targets are protected at every round.
• The state space is S = S1 × S2 × . . .× Sn. Denote s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn).
• The action space is A = {(a1, a2, . . . , an)|aj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ N,
∑
j∈N a
j =
k}, which represents that only k targets can be protected at a round.
Denote a = (a1, a2, . . . , an).
• The observation spaceO = O1×O2×. . .×On. Denote o = (o1, o2, . . . , on).
• The conditional transition probability is P (s′|s, a) =
∏
j∈N P
j(s
′j |sj , aj).
• The conditional observation probability is P (o|s, a) =
∏
j∈N P
j(oj |sj , aj).
• The reward function is R(s, s′, a, o) =
∏
j∈NR(s
j , s
′j,aj ,oj ).
Silver and Veness [20] have proposed POMCP algorithm, which provides high
quality solutions and is scalable to large POMDPs. The POMCP algorithm only
requires a simulator of the problem so it also applies to our special POMDPs. At
a high level, the POMCP algorithm is composed of two parts: it uses a particle
filter to maintain an approximation of the belief state; it draw state samples
from the particle filter and then use MCTS to simulate what will happen next
to find the best action. It uses a particle filter to approximate the belief state
because it is even computationally impossible in many problems to update belief
state due to the extreme large size of the state space. However, in our problem,
the all–target POMDP model is the cross product of the single–target POMDP
models at all targets. The single–state POMDP model is small so that it is
computationally inexpensive to maintain its belief state. Thus, the state si at
target i can be sampled from its belief state and then compose them together
to get the state sample s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) for the all–target POMDP model.
4.2 Online planning for optimal protector strategies in re-
source conservation games
Protectors (law enforcement agencies) try to protect natural resources, while
extractors (criminals) seek to exploit them. In many domains, such as illegal
fishing, the extractors know more about the distribution and richness of the
resources than the protectors, making it extremely difficult for the protectors
to optimally allocate their assets for patrol and interdiction. Fortunately, ex-
tractors carry out frequent illegal extractions, so protectors can learn about the
richness of resources by observing the extractor’s behavior.
24
In resource conservation domains, the protector often does not know the
distribution of resources while the extractor may have more information about
it, e.g. preventing illegal fishing. Our goal is to provide an optimal asset de-
ployment (e.g., patrol) strategy for the protector, given her lack of knowledge
about the distribution of resources.
4.2.1 Problem formulation
In resource conservation games, the extractor’s frequent illegal extractions pro-
vide the protector with the opportunity to learn about the distribution of re-
sources by observing the extractor’s behavior. The aim is the construction of
an online policy for the protector to maximize her utility given observations of
the extractor. At every round, the protector chooses one site to protect and the
extractor simultaneously chooses one site to steal from. Both the extractor and
the protector have full knowledge about each other’s previous actions.
In our model, the amount of resources at each site will be fixed and the
extractor will have full knowledge of this distribution. The protector will have
to learn this distribution by observing the extractor’s behavior.
There is a finite time horizon t ∈ T . There are n sites indexed by N =
{1, 2, . . . , n} that represent the locations of the natural resource in question:
the extractor wants to steal resources from these sites and the protector wants
to interdict the extractor. The value of the sites to the extractor is represented in
terms of their utilities. Each site has a utility u(i) that is only known to the ex-
tractor. The utility space is discretized into m levels, u(i) ∈M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
Human beings cannot distinguish between tiny differences in utilities in the real
world, so discretizing these utilities is justified. For n sites and m utility lev-
els, there are mn possible sets of utilities across all sites. The distribution of
resources is then captured by the vector of utilities at each site, and the set of
possible resource distributions is:
U = {(u(1), u(2), . . . , u(n)) : u(i) ∈M, ∀i ∈ N}
Assuming that the resource levels u(i), i ∈ N are independent from each
other, at the beginning of the game, the protector may have some prior knowl-
edge about the resource levels u(i) at each site i ∈ N . This prior knowledge is
represented as a probability density function p(u(i)) over M . If the protector
does not know anything about u(i), then a uniform prior for u(i) over M is
adopted. At each time t ∈ T , the protector chooses a site at ∈ N to protect
and the extractor simultaneously chooses a site ot ∈ N from which to steal. If
at = ot, the protector catches the extractor and the extractor is penalized by
the amount P (ot) < 0; if at 6= ot, the extractor successfully steals resources
from site ot and gets a payoff of u(ot). For clarity, the protector’s interdiction is
always successful whenever it visits the same site as the extractor. Additionally,
the protector fully observes the moves of the extractor, likewise, the extractor
fully observes the moves of the protector. Note that the penalty P (i), i ∈ N is
known to both the protector and the extractor. A zero–sum game is adopted,
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so the protector is trying to minimize the extractor’s payoffs. In most resource
conservation domains, the extractor pays the same penalty P if he is seized inde-
pendent of the site he visits. Varying penalties across sites for greater generality
are allowed. A fictitious Quantal Response playing (FQR) extractor is assumed.
Specifically, a fictitious extractor assumes the protector’s empirical distribution
will be his mixed strategy in the next round. In this behavior model, the ex-
tractor makes decisions based on the parameters u(i), P (i), i ∈ N , as well as the
protector’s actions in previous rounds.
The extractor behaves in the following way: in every round, he computes
the empirical coverage probability ci for every site i based on the history of
the protector’s actions, then computes the expected utility EU(i) = c(i)P (i) +
(1− c(i))u(i) for every site and finally attempts to steal from the site i with the
probability proportional to eλEU(i) where λ ≥ 0 is the parameter representing
the rationality of the player (higher λ represents a more rational player).
To implement the above model, two technical questions must be resolved.
First, at every round t, based on her current belief about u, how should the pro-
tector choose sites to protect in the next round? Second, after each round, how
should the protector use the observation of the latest round to update her beliefs
about u? Here, decision making and belief updating in a partially observable
environment, where the payoffs u are unobservable and the extractor’s actions
are observable, are being studied, which is the exact setup for a POMDP. A two–
player game is now setup as a POMDP {S,A,O, T,Ω, R} where the extractor
follows a quantal response model.
• The state space of our POMDP is S = U ×Zn, which is the cross product
of the utility space and the count space. U is the utility space. Zn is the
set of possible counts of the protector’s visits to each site, where Ct ∈ Zn
is an integer-valued vector where Ct(i), i ∈ N is the number of times that
the protector has protected site i at the beginning of round t ∈ T . A
particular state s ∈ S is written as s = (u,C), where u is the vector of
utility levels for each site and C is the current state count. The initial
beliefs are expressed by a distribution over s = (u, 0), induced by the
prior distribution on u. ct(i) =
Ct(i)
t−1 denotes the frequency with which
the protector visits site i at the beginning of round t ∈ T . c1 = 0 by
convention.
• The action space A is N , representing the site the protector chooses to
protect.
• The observation space O is N , representing the site the extractor chooses
to attempt to steal from.
• Let ea ∈ Rn denote the unit vector with a 1 in slot a ∈ N and zeros else-
where. The conditional transition probability T governing the evolution
of the state is:
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T (s′ = (u′, C′)|s = (u,C), a) =
{
1 u = u′, C′ = C + ea,
0, otherwise
Specifically, the evolution of the state is deterministic. The underlying
utilities do not change, and the count for the site visited by the protector
increases by one while all others stay the same.
• EU(u,C) ∈ Rn defines the vector of empirical expected utilities for the
extractor for all sites when the actual utility is u and the count is C,
[EU(u,C)](i) = c(i)P (i) + (1− c(i))u(i), ∀i ∈ N,
when t ≥ 1. [EU(u, 0)](i) = u(i) by convention. Hence, our observation
probabilities are explicitly:
Ω(o|s′ = (u,C), a) =
eλ[EU(u,C−ea)](o)∑
i∈N e
λ[EU(u,C−ea)](i)
the probability of observing the extractor takes action o when the protector
takes action a and arrives at state s. Note that both a and o are the actions
the protector/extractor take at the same round.
• The reward function R is:
R(s = (u,C), s′ = (u,C + ea), a, o) =
{
−P (o), a = o
−u(o), a 6= o
4.2.2 GMOP algorithm
The size of the utility space U is mn, and the size of the count space is O
(
Tn
n!
)
.
The computational cost of the latest POMDP solvers soon become unaffordable
for us as the problem size grows.
Silver and Veness [20] have proposed the POMCP algorithm, which provides
high quality solutions for large POMDPs. The POMCP algorithm uses a particle
filter to approximate the belief state. Then, it uses Monte Carlo tree search
(MCTS) for online planning where state samples are drawn from the particle
filter and the action with the highest expected utility based on Monte Carlo
simulations is chosen. However, the particle filter is only an approximation of
the true belief state and is likely to move further away from the actual belief
state as the game goes on, especially when most particles get depleted and new
particles need to be added. Adding new particles will either make the particle
filter a worse approximation of the exact belief state, if the added particles do
not follow the distribution of the belief state or be as difficult as drawing samples
directly from the belief state, if the added particles do follow the distribution
of the belief state.
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Our POMDP has specific structure that can be exploited. The count state
in S is known and the utility state does not change, making it possible to draw
samples directly from the exact belief state using Gibbs sampling. We propose
the GMOP algorithm that draws samples directly from the exact belief state
using Gibbs sampling, and then runs MCTS. The samples drawn directly from
the belief state better represent the true belief state compared to samples drawn
from a particle filter.
At a high level, in round t the protector draws samples of state s from
its belief state Bt(s) using Gibbs sampling and then it runs MCTS using those
samples. Finally, it executes the action with the highest expected utility. MCTS
starts with a tree that only contains a root node. Since the count state Ct is
already known, the protector only needs to sample the utility state u from Bt.
The sampled state s is comprised of the sampled utility u and the count Ct.
Gibbs sampling [2] is a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for
sampling from multivariate probability distributions. Let X = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
be a general random vector with n components and with finite support described
by the multivariate probability density p(X). Gibbs sampling only requires the
conditional probabilities p(xi|xi) to simulate X , where xi = (xj)j 6=i denotes
the subset of all components of X except component i. Gibbs sampling is
useful when direct sampling from p(X) is difficult. Suppose k samples of X =
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) should be obtained.
Gibbs sampling works in general to produce these samples using only the
conditional probabilities p(xi|x−i). It constructs a Markov chain whose steady-
state distribution is given by p(X), so that the samples also follow the distribu-
tion p(X). The states of this Markov chain are the possible realizations of X =
(x1, x2, . . . , xn), and a specific state Xi is denoted as Xi = (xi1, xi2, . . . , xin)
(there are finitely many such states by our assumption). The transition probabil-
ities of this Markov chain, Pr(Xj |Xi), follow from the conditional probabilities
p(xi|x−i). Specifically, Pr(Xj |Xi) = p(xl|x−l) when xjv = xiv for all v not
equal to l, and is equal to zero otherwise, i.e. the state transitions only change
one component of the vector–valued sample at a time. This Markov chain is
reversible (meaning p(Xi)Pr(Xj |Xi) = P (Xj)Pr(Xi|Xj), ∀i, j) so p(X) is its
steady–state distribution.
4.2.3 Applying Gibbs sampling in GMOP
Let Bt be the probability distribution representing the protector’s beliefs about
the true utilities at the beginning of round t ≥ 1; B1 represents the protector’s
prior beliefs when the game starts. Let Bt(u) denote the probability of the
vector of utilities u with respect to the distribution Bt. Let B be the prior
belief distribution and B be the posterior belief distribution. Our Bayesian
belief update rule to obtain B from B and the observation is explicitly:
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B′(s′ = (u,C)) = ηΩ(o|s′, a)
∑
s∈S
T (s′|s, a)B(s)
= ηΩ(o|s′, a)B(s = (u,C − ea))
If at and ot represent the actions that the protector and the extractor choose
to take at round t:
Bt(u) = ηBt−1(u)Ω(ot−1|s = (u,Ct), at−1)
= η′B1(u)
t−1∏
i=1
Ω(oi|s = (u,Ci+1), ai)
It follows that the posterior belief Bt is proportional to the prior belief B1
multiplied by the observation probabilities over the entire history. Since there
are mn possible utilities, it is impossible to store and update Bt when m and
n are large, and thus it is impossible to sample directly from Bt. Hence, Gibbs
sampling is adopted.
Only the conditional probabilities p(ui|u−i), ∀i in Bt are needed:
p(ui|u−i) = ηp(ui, u−i) = ηBt(ui, u−i) =
η′B1(ui, u−i)
t−1∏
j=1
Ω(oj |s = (u = (ui, u−i), Cj+1), aj) =
η′′B1(ui)
t−1∏
j=1
Ω(oj |s = (u = (ui, u−i), Cj+1), aj)
This quantity is easy to compute where B1(ui) is the prior probability that
site i has utility ui. Besides the conditional probability, also a valid u with
Bt(u) > 0 should be found to initialize Gibbs sampling. Finding such a u is
easy in our FQR model because any u with B1(u) > 0 satisfies Bt(u) > 0.
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